What Does It Mean
to Be European?

Peter Robinett

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Faculty Reader:

Prof. William Sewell

Introduction

The word Europe has many meanings for many different people. Most commonly Europe has meant a melange of geography, culture, civilization, and religion. While Europe's meaning was previously quite stable, old certainties have disappeared. Now one must ask, What does it mean now to be European? While it may appear that such a question would have so many answers as to be irrelevant, there has almost always been one dominant view. The question of what it means to be European is one about belonging, of how people feel themselves to be European. This question is best answered through a three part process: first, defining the nature of Europe; second, unpacking the principal European identity; and third, understanding how Europe relates to others. Answering these questions reveals that to be European is to hold faith in a certain set of political values and ideals. This identity is one that many people find easy to hold in relation to national identities. Also, this identity is quite inclusive, meaning that one can become European, and relatively easily.

There are two unique relationships at play with European identity that challenge traditional conceptions of identity. First, European identity coexists with national identities. Second, unlike most, if not all, national identities, European identity has its basis in shared political, or civic, values, rather than in common culture, history, and language. European identity is not a national identity, either in fact or in development, but rather a unique form of collective identity. Furthermore, European identity is unique because its boundaries and borders are devalued and confused. As befits an identity based upon political values, European identity changes to include more people as borders change. Furthermore, the boundaries used to delineate the "Europe," and thus European identity, are often in conflict with one another or do not line up evenly. The Self/Other

distinction so fundamental to defining an identity is problematized. Instead of rigid

opposition, European identity allows one to cross easily between Other and Self. Because

of the relative ease of entrance many new states have joined the EU, with the constant

flux preventing a stable Self/Other distinction from crystallizing.

European Identity as a Collective Identity

Identity is a complex set of beliefs by which one defines oneself. In examining

European identity one is focusing specifically on a social, or collective, identity. Wendt

explains:

> "*Social* identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself
> while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object (McCall
> and Simmons 1978, 61-100). In contrast to the singular quality of
> corporate identity, actors normally have multiple social identities that vary
> in salience. Also in contrast, social identities have both individual and
> social structural properties, being at once cognitive schemas that enable an
> actor to determine 'who I am/we are' in a situation and positions in a
> social role structure of shared understandings and expectations."[1]

Thus the study of European identity is the study of the meanings an actor attributes to

itself in comparison to others with respect to Europe. Europe itself should be understood

as a complex of ideas to which actors have assigned meaning.

With regards to the basis of European identity, Triandafyllidou and Spohn say that

it is "an attachment to the evolving European transnational governance regime."[2]

European identity has its basis in a shared belief in a set of political values, not in a

shared culture or history. Giesen makes compelling arguments that only the existence of a

collective identity can explain the development of the EU.[3] Giesen believes that European

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[1] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* **88**, No. 2 (June 1994), 385.

[2] Anna Triandafyllidou and Willfried Spohn, "Introduction," in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*, eds. Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou, (London: Routledge, 2003) 8.

[3] Bernhard Giesen, "The collective identity of Europe: Constitutional practice or community of memory?" in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*, 21.

identity must be collective, for "only if we presuppose the collective identity of the demos can we … conceive of a body politic beyond the volatile coalition of strategic interests."[4] Münch in fact suggests that the European people cannot be conceived as anything more than a "coalition of strategic interests."

How Does European Identity Challenge Traditional Notions of Identity?

Having defined European identity as a collective identity based on a shared system of political values, one must ask why this is relevant. European identity is associated with a unique political organization, the European Union. Just as national identity has been associated with the nation-state, European identity is now associated with the European Union. The former is the predominant object of inquiry in investigations of identity, while the only historical examples of identities associated with multi-national political organizations are those of empires. However, the EU cannot be considered an empire, as its members participate voluntarily. Likewise there is one European identity, rather than the many, often antagonistic, national identities of empires.

What Is Europe?

The Conflation of Europe and the European Union

May 1, 2004 saw the entry of 8 Eastern European nations, plus Malta and Cyprus, into the European Union (EU). This historic expansion is described as the Eastern European "return to Europe"[5] after the artificial separation of the Cold War. Of course these states never left the European continent. Yet, there is something else at play: the European Union has become conflated with Europe. Risse notes that "the EU as an active identity builder has successfully achieved identity hegemony in terms of increasingly

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[4]   Giesen, 21.
[5]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 7.

defining what it means to belong to 'Europe'."[6] Thus a political entity has taken the place of a geographical one.

While rare, such a phenomenon is not without precedence: witness the frequent use of "America" to refer to the United States of America, one of many states found in the continents of North and South America. However, the American example cannot be easily used to explain this new Europe. For one, America refers to a single state, while Europe refers to a supranational political organization composed of 25 states. In the current conflation of the European Union with Europe we see a new Europe, one that is "less a cultural discourse than a political organization."[7] Thus the cultural definition of Europe has been replaced by a civic one that emphasizes a shared political process. Risse notes that "states in Europe are increasingly defined as EU members, non-members, or would-be members. Their status in Europe and to some degree also worldwide depends on these categories."[8] Thus the notion of what it means to be European has changed, such that categories now rely on the EU as the basis of their definitions.

The History of the Idea of Europe and European Identity

The notion of "Europe" is an ancient one, whose meanings have changed over time. The Greeks were the first to use the term, to distinguish the cultures of the peoples west of them from their own. Since then it has had many connotations, being associated with the Roman Empire, the Carolingian empire, and all of Christendom.[9] Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist claim that the Carolingians had "the perception of Europe as a political entity based on a Christian community."[10] While there may have been a political

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6   Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration," in *European Integration Theory*, eds. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press., 2004) 169.
7   Giesen, 21.
8   Risse, 169.
9   Christen Jönsson, Sven Tägil and Gunnar Törnqvist, *Organizing European Space*, (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 7.
10 Jönsson et al., 7.

component to this conception of Europe, it would not be for another millennium that the political nature of Europe would come to the forefront. Stirk notes, "The survival of the idea of Europe was partly due to its elasticity. It could be and was appropriated by individuals of diverse ideological inclinations."[11] Giesen notes that the thinkers of the Enlightenment saw the idea of Europe as universal: "Everybody's true identity was European – and it was the task of education and emancipation to further the awareness of this identity."[12] It is here in the 18th Century that one sees the beginning of the conception of European identity as something that is achieved, that one can become. This notion is intimately tied to the conception of European identity being based on civic values: one's political values may easily change, while it is much harder to change cultures.

The two centuries preceding the current European political project saw a variety of different notions of Europe put forward. Common among them was a belief in Europe as a political unification of the states of the European continent. Such a unified Europe need not be a liberal democracy: Napoleon's European system and Hitler's New Order can both be understood as attempts to create this Europe.[13] However, other concepts were also common, as Stirk explains: "The idea of Europe has a long pedigree which is often difficult to distinguish from the quest for peace and a league or federation of nations. Indeed, the three tended to mean much the same thing so long as European politics could plausibly be regarded as world politics."[14] Thus, Europe can also be understood to be a utopian movement seeking to unify mankind. There is explicit precedence to these ideas in the works of William Penn, whose *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of*

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[11]   Peter M.R. Stirk, "Introduction: Crisis and Continuity in Interwar Europe," in *European unity in context: the interwar period*, ed. Peter M.R. Stirk, (London: Pinter, 1989) 11.
[12]   Giesen, 30.
[13]   Stirk 1989, 18.
[14]   Stirk 1989, 4.

Europe was written in 1693, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, whose *Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* (Memoirs *to Make Peace Perpetual in Europe*) continued the subject in 1712.[15]

The 19th Century saw a subtle but important shift in how "Europe" was used. While previously it had been mobilized simply in reference to a common culture or civilization, by the 1800's the idea of Europe took on new, if decidedly minority, meaning as a promise of political unification of European states, which would produce peace and prosperity. Such a perspective is seen in Saint-Simon's 1814 treatise *De la réorganisation de la société européene* (*Of the Reorganization of European Society*), which stressed the need for a federal government acting in the common interest of all European nations.[16] Here one sees the beginning of the importance of political forms in the content of European identity. Such a change probably has two causes: the rise of the modern state and the development of nationalism. Both processes, but especially the rapid growth of nationalism in the 19th Century, served to develop more distinct national identities. Thus, the Europe of Saint-Simon and his contemporaries can be understood as a response to this divisive development. European identity was a claim against nation-states, seeing them as artificial constructs against the common basis of European culture and civilization. Why then was the Europe of Saint-Simon and others more political than social? For one, it is because they are not advocating a return to the past, to feudalism, where boundaries were weaker and often contradictory. Instead, they are advocating a step forward, the continuation of the consolidation of political power in nation-states in the form of a European-wide federation. This has the, perhaps unanticipated, effect of downplaying the

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[15]   John Keane, "Questions for Europe," in *The Idea of Europe: problems of national and transnational identity*, eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and Walter Veit, (New York: Berg, 1992) 58.
[16]   Peter M.R. Stirk, *A history of European integration since 1914*, (New York: Pinter, 1996) 6.

cultural element of European identity, with the (wished for future) political element taking its place.

While the last two hundred years has seen a shift away from thinking of Europe as a shared culture, the shift has been gradual and is no means done. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, perhaps the most prominent supporter of the idea of a federal Europe in the interwar years of the 20th Century, believed the nations of the European continent "all belonged to the one great paternal class of Europeans, children of a single race, a single continent, a single civilisation and a single destiny."[17] In his definition of Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi took pains to exclude Russia, which he saw as an external threat to Europe.[18] Thus the shift from a cultural to a political conception of Europe was by no means complete and the two coexist to this day.

The scope of the "Europe" of common discourse has expanded over the last 60 years, including more countries as the membership of the EU and its predecessors has grown. The time from the creation of the ECSC in 1951 through the 2004 enlargement into Eastern Europe saw progressive widenings: the initial group of 6 has grown over the years to 25 member nations. The bursts of expansion have not been marred by serious disagreement on the Europeanness of the selected countries, though there has been some disagreement over certain aspirant countries. The only clear example of what is (not) European was given when Morocco's application for membership was rejected in 1962 on the basis of not being European.[19] On the other hand, the question of Turkish membership was first addressed in 1963, when Turkey was told it did not currently meet membership

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[17]   Coudenhove-Kalergi as cited in Ralph White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi," in *European unity in context: the interwar*, 25.
[18]   White, 27.
[19]   Fraser Cameron, "Principles and Problems of EU Eastern Enlargement," in *EU Enlargement and Beyond: The Baltic States and Russia*, ed. Hubel, (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 2002) 109.

requirements but that it was eligible for eventual membership, thus implying that Turkey

is in fact a European nation.[20] This is despite the fact that the vast majority of Turkey's

territory lies in Asia Minor, which is not part of the European continent. Likewise,

Norway and Switzerland have both applied for membership (1972 and 1991, and 1992,

respectively) and been accepted, yet each time domestic opinion was opposed to entry

and neither nation has joined the EU.[21] However, the acceptance of their membership

applications shows that the EU considers them to be European, which is not surprising

from a geographic perspective, since they are in the heartland of (Western) Europe;

Switzerland is in fact completely surrounded by EU nations.

The year 2004 saw the most recent enlargement (also the largest ever, with 10

countries joining), yet "the enlargement process will not stop here."[22] Likewise a

convention was held in 2003, including the 2004 members, that attempted to create a

constitution for the EU. Much of the controversy around this contentious constitution is

related to efforts by some to define Europe beyond political ideals, that is culturally and

religiously. This effort is, essentially, one of defining what is European. Thus, the current

situation is such that at efforts are underway to define European identity, while at the

same time there is a (non-binding) commitment to change the identity of Europe that

currently exists by making it more inclusive, expanding the Union, which is now Europe,

in further rounds of enlargement.

Literature Review

Though a new field, the study of European identity has already produced several

different theories that seek to explain its character and formation. Grosby defines the

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[20] Cameron, "Principles and Problems," 109.
[21] Geoffry Harris, "The Wider Europe," in *The Future of Europe: Integration and enlargement*, ed. Fraser
       Cameron, (London: Routledge, 2004) 112.
[22] Romano Prodi as cited in Harris, 100.

traditional notion of identity: "a collective consciousness (rituals, customs, traditions, laws, historical knowledge, and even language) associated with a particular territory." Applying Grosby's rubric, one can understand European identity as being based upon cultural products limited to territories clearly defined by boundaries and borders. However, this is not true, with both the role of culture and the placement of identities within clearly defined territories called into question.

Risse's application of social constructivism to European identity puts forward a model that focuses on the collaborative role of society in shaping identity. Social constructivism is "based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings ('culture' in a broad sense)."[23] He explains that "social identities contain, first, ideas describing and categorizing an individual's membership in a social group or community including emotional, affective, and evaluative components,"[24] and suggests that European identity could be such a community. Likewise he suggests three potential forms of European identification: nested, cross-cutting, and "marble cake"—that is, mixed such that each one is essential to the other.[25] Ultimately, social constructivism as used by Risse is more useful to explain why European identity *should* be studied than to explain what European identity actually *is*. That being said, his forms of identification are helpful in examining the relationship of European identity to national identities, as all three assume a pluralism of identity in which European identity is one of many identities. Risse also notes that various elements of European identity may differ in importance for each person.[26]

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[23]   Risse, 160.
[24]   Risse, 167.
[25]   Risse, 168.
[26]   Risse, 167.

Giesen puts forward a procedural model of collective identity to explain European

identity, using Habermas' notion of *Verfassungspatriotismus*. He describes such European

identity as "constitutional patriotism," which is not the love of one's homeland, but rather

the love of one's constitution.[27] One may interpret this broadly such that it means an

attachment to a set of political principles. He suggests that collective identity, as

described by the procedural model, is the "attempt to ground the body politic in the

practice of political traditions."[28] Thus one sees that Giesen's procedural model, not

surprisingly, gives precedence to the *process* and practice of membership in the EU.

Thus, European identity is formed from a common set of political ideals, rather than from

a common culture or history. Action is essential, as it is in putting into effect these ideals

that the collective identity is established.

Münch suggests a theory of multi-level identity, such that there is no monolithic

European identity but many trans-European identities focused on narrow individual

interests. This pluralism of identities arises due to European integration, which destroys

mechanical solidarity, with an "organic solidarity of cooperation"[29] arising in its place. In

a clear statement of his views, Münch declares:

> "Europe is not so much formed from individual nations, their collective
> solidarities and their national cultures, but more from the strongly
> differentiated cooperation of individuals which, in turn, is formed by an
> ever growing number of associations. The individualisation of
> responsibilities pushes the uniform collective organization of social life
> through the nation-state into the background thus giving way to the more
> varied and differentiated coordination of action within Europe. European
> society evolves as a multi-level network society."[30]

This explanation of European identity places emphasis on the multiplicity of identities,

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[27]   Giesen, 22.
[28]   Giesen, 22.
[29]   Richard Münch, "Democracy without demos," in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*,
       58.
[30]   Münch, 61.

which combine to form the meta-identity that one calls European identity. These identities are not equal in their interactions, with some more fully developed than others and some given more weight than others, creating levels of identities. While it is true that European identity may mean different things to different people, to say that it is only a collection denies the core civic elements that now take precedence over all other conceptions of Europeanness.

Münch disagrees that European identity is an example of collective identity, believing instead that a wave of individualism is sweeping Europe, such that there will be a Europe of individuals, rather than groups. However, what this actually means is unclear. Putting it broadly, he says, "The scope for the unfolding of individual consciousness and individual identity is growing to the same extent as the collective consciousness is becoming weaker and more abstract."[31] Münch suggests here that collective identities *as a whole* are disappearing, to be replaced by a network of "associations," which presumably do not have the same inspirational force as collective identities. However, it seems unlikely that all one's membership in associations will be so mild as to never inspire any sort of identification. Such a distinction is only relevant if one believes that collective identities must be powerfully felt, to the exclusion of all other communal feelings. While it may be true that national collective identities are declining, it does not follow that European identity must be individual instead of collective. To suppose so is to suggest that Europeanness is a quality felt by individuals independently of others. It appears that Münch is trying to make a distinction between European consciousness and identity. However, such a distinction erroneously assumes that identity must be a zero sum game, in which a person may only have one identity at a time, in contrast to Risse, while

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[31]   Münch, 61.

having many consciousnesses. Likewise, identity must be strongly felt and consciousness weakly. The difference between the two is ultimately created by the language deployed and is only one of degrees.

One line of thought holds that European identity is postmodernist, against moral absolutism and grand narratives. Hutchinson describes such a version of European identity as "largely deconstructionist in character, retaining for itself an essential lack of identity."[32] Is European identity found in the lack of identity? Such a claim is confusing and unclear. What one could take it to mean is that European identity is based on an avoidance of limitation, seeking to embrace the most possible. This approach has much in common with Münch's European identity of individuals, as seen in van Ham's description of "Europe's postmodern anguish, now that traditional moorings like the nation-state, the national currency and cradle-to-grave welfare security have given way to Europeanization, the Euro and greater individualization."[33] However, Hutchinson rejects postmodernist interpretations of European identity:

> "A postmodernist celebration of the multiplicity of identities is possible in a stable and prosperous world without obvious external or internal threats. But only a potent and definite identity is capable of orienting and mobilising collective action in order to overcome threats such as eruption of wars (in the Balkans), Islamic terrorist threats, economic recessions, and the prospect of large-scale immigration."[34]

Avoiding focusing on Hutchinson's specific examples of threats, one still finds much to which to object in his statement. First, his assumption of an increasingly dangerous world for Europe is questionable: throughout the Cold War the nations of Europe lived under constant fear of World War III commencing on their soil, whether through massive

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[32]   John Hutchinson, "Enduring nations and the illusions of european integration," in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*, 46.
[33]   Peter van Ham, *European integration and the postmodern condition: governance, democracy, identity*, (London: Routledge, 2001) 191.
[34]   Hutchinson, 47.

invasion or nuclear exchange; one cannot say that the threats of terrorism or immigration compare. Second, the assumption that plurality of identities must equate to weakness and inability to address pressing issues is unfounded. The existence of cooperative management of borders and immigration through the Schengen Plan shows that European forms have begun to address such important issues as immigration. Likewise, the weakness or strength of European identity is a separate issue from its existence or nature. European identity need not be strong for it to exist.

Hutchinson does allow that a European identity might exist. He notes that "there has always been a consciousness, at the elite level, of belonging to a European as well as to a local culture."[35] Moreover, "from their very beginning, nations, aware of their part in a multi-actor civilisation, defined themselves as contributors to a European civilisation."[36] Thus there exists a consciousness, a sense of civilization, that is distinctly European. Hutchinson notes that "many, if not most, European national identities have been developed either alongside or in relation to a sense of Europeanness."[37] And yet, is this enough? Others would say so, that common historical consciousness of Europeanness can provide the basis of a concrete and powerful European identity. Hutchinson is wary of such a notion and seeks to introduce a distinction between consciousness and identity. He states, "there is indeed a *consciousness* of being European, but an identity is more than a sense (it supplies fundamental prescriptions about conduct), and this consciousness is mediated through the different and often competing national identities of Europeans."[38] Such a claim has merit, considering the large gap between national and ethnic identities and a European one. However, it better to see the two as a continuum, rather than distinct

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[35]   Hutchinson, 42.
[36]   Hutchinson, 42.
[37]   Hutchinson, 37.
[38]   Hutchinson, 50.

formations. It is more useful to speak of levels of European identification, rather than attempting to make a distinction between a European consciousness and a European identity.

What Is European Identity?

In contrast to national identities, which are understood to be based upon a national culture, European identity is much more indefinite and inclusive. Triandafyllidou and Spohn describe this relationship to culture as one of "cultural pluralism," explaining that multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of European identity.[39] Lacking a common culture, Münch says that the "common features within Europe are … of an abstract type."[40] It is not a common culture or history that binds people, but a "varied, widely branched and finely differentiated network of more or less permanent loyalty relationships."[41] Likewise, previous collective cultures "are replaced by a pluralism of varied and widely branched associations and cultural patterns."[42] Unlike most, if not all, national identities, European identity is not based upon a common culture.

European Identity Is a Civic Identity

Giesen's procedural model of collective identity explains well how European identity is found in common civic beliefs. Using Habermas' *Verfassungspatriotismus*, Giesen explains that European identity is "the identification with a constitution and the participation in its political practice that defines citizenship" and an "attempt to ground the body politic in the practice of political traditions."[43] Thus European identity is a civic

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[39]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 1.
[40]   Münch, 74.
[41]   Münch, 74.
[42]   Münch, 74.
[43]   Giesen, 21.

identity in which membership is on the basis of a shared political practice. This practice is

not simply a shared set of institutions and laws that are collected in the form of the EU,

but also political ideals and values. This should not be surprising, as practice must

obviously be informed by values and ideals. Thus, European identity is based on a belief

in democratic systems, and specifically the democratic systems as formulated and

developed in European nations and the EU.

The existence of this belief can be seen in the attitude sometimes expressed

toward potential Israeli membership in the EU. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi

has publicly stated that Israel could eventually join, as has Bronislaw Geremek, former

Polish Foreign Minister.[44] Silvan Shalom, Israeli Foreign Minister, explained that "a

possibility exists for Israel to join the EU, since Israel and Europe share similar

economics and democratic values."[45] The fact that politicians both inside and outside the

EU are willing to consider Israeli membership indicates the presence and power of a civic

European identity, for under traditional conceptions of Europe Israeli membership would

be immediately dismissed as impossible. While many Israelis immigrated from Europe,

there are significant cultural differences. Furthermore, Israel is completely outside the

geographic boundaries of Europe. By elimination one must come to the conclusion that

shared civic values are the basis for these statements.

According to Hutchinson no "new cultural basis is being created."[46] Münch has an

even stronger verdict, declaring: "A clearly outlined European cultural unity will not

arise, nor will the nations and their cultural traditions form its elementary parts."[47] If one

considers figure 2 it is readily apparent that most Europeans feel more national than

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[44]   Harris, 104.
[45]   Silvan Shalom as cited in Harris, 103.
[46]   Hutchinson, 42.
[47]   Münch, 52.

European. One way to explain this gap, in addition to the fact that national identities are older and more established than the (current) European identity, is the fact that European identity lacks much in the way of cultural basis to give it support. Lacking these emotional, or irrational, forms of identification in the collective, European identity is unable to attract the same level of support.

Risse notes that there is "identification with the EU as a distinct civic and political entity," though he also admits there is also identification with "a larger Europe as a cultural and historically defined social space."[48] Thus, one should not confuse the existence of a civic European identity with the non-existence of a cultural one. Yet, this civic European identity is growing at the expense of the cultural identity and dominates current discourse. Thanks to its inherent association with the EU, the new Europe, the European *Verfassungspatriotismus* has become *the* predominant European identity. In this one sees the identity hegemony Risse mentioned.[49]

Cultural Claims to Europeanness

However, many still speak of common European civilization or culture. Woźniakowski says there is one European civilization and speaks of "common traditions."[50] Giesen notes that "Europe, too, can claim such a common cultural heritage," which he sees in the Augustinian conflict of the two cities.[51] Martin says, "the European spirit resides in a certain *establishment of* values, such as is rather absent in America, for example, and is practised in Asia according to a different set of rules, resulting in an order other than ours. In Europe there is a certain *order of things*."[52] Likewise he declares that

[48] Risse, 170.
[49] Risse, 169.
[50] Jacek Woźniakowski, "Is Greater Europe Possible?" in *From the World of Borders to the World of Horizons*, ed. Purchla, (Cracow: International Cultural Centre, 2001) 15.
[51] Giesen, 26.
[52] Mircea Martin, "Europe from an Eastern Perspective. Some Notes on European Cultural Identity," in *From the World of Borders to the World of Horizons*, 215.

"the existence of certain *permanent* trans-linguistic and trans-cultural European values cannot be denied."[53] But how valid are these claims? For one, the undefined character of this supposed European cultural identity argues that such a thing does not exist; any cultural characteristics that one might find in common among the nations of Europe one could also find in many nations outside of Europe. Likewise, the vague nature of such common "traditions," "features," and "virtues" implies that they do not have much power. While this does not mean they cannot exist, the fact that they are not defined as well as European civic identity suggests that they are relatively minor. Likewise, talk about common European culture is not very widespread. While this may be because it is seen as politically or socially unacceptable to suggest such a thing exists, one still assumes that the lack of widespread mention indicates little support for the notion.

Cameron notes that some oppose Turkish membership in the EU because Turkey does not share "Europe's philosophical and religious traditions;" that is, the population is mostly Muslim, and the country did not participate in the Enlightenment.[54] Former Turkish President Turgut Ozal put it thus, "Why are we not yet in the European Community? The answer is simple. You are Christians and we are Muslims."[55] In figure 4 one sees that support for Turkish membership hovers around 35%, while approximately 45% are in opposition. While cultural differences are not the only reason for objection,[56] it must surely be a significant one. It is also worth noting that, as acceptance of an applicant country by the existing members must be unanimous, it would only take one country to prevent Turkish membership.[57]

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[53]   Martin, 215.
[54]   Fraser Cameron, "Widening and deepening," in *The Future of Europe*, 11.
[55]   van Ham, 213.
[56]   Turkey's poor human rights record is another common reason. This objection can be seen as tied into the civic identity line of thinking.
[57]   As was shown in France's opposition to British membership in the 1960's.

Giesen suggests that there is a European identity based on a common traumatic past.[58] He suggests collective trauma and guilt, particularly for World War II and the Holocaust, bind the nations of Europe. While others throughout the world have similar troubled pasts, only Europe has responded which such remorse, which he attributes to a "European, Christian Christomimesis."[59] He declares, "European identity relies on a cultural heritage that continues – in many transformations – even if the Europeans are no longer aware of it."[60] Thus this identity of collective trauma and guilt has a cultural basis in Christianity. However, one must question the role such sentiments play; there seems to be little evidence that such common feelings have formed the *basis* of any sort of identity, European or otherwise.

How Does Europe Relate to Others?

Europe Is Not a New National Identity

Traditional conceptions of national identity hold that an individual may hold only one identity at a time. Thus, one may be French or German, but not French *and* German. Some seek to take this understanding and transfer it to explain European identity, treating it as another national identity. Thus this new identity must replace existing national identities. Triandafyllidou and Spohn note that many in Eastern Europe fear "threats to the national cultures and identities by the secular and materialist culture of Western Europe."[61] Such fears are based on the assumption that the coexistence of identities will not or cannot occur.

Hutchinson believes that nations, and national identity, will survive even if the

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[58]   Giesen, 31.
[59]   Giesen, 33.
[60]   Giesen, 33.
[61]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 7.

EU destroys the nation-states of Europe.[62] He declares that "national identities endure even when stripped of their protecting state, and the legitimacy of nation-states rests ultimately not on just the provisions of economic and social progress but on more deep-seated attachments."[63] This statement suggests that national identities will endure in the European Union even as nation-states weaken. Likewise, bringing economic and social advancement to Europeans is not enough for the EU to create a popular identification in itself.

Cameron notes that joining the EU need not mean a loss of national identity.[64] Instead, membership in the EU, which is now synonymous with being part of Europe, adds to a nation's existing identity, and European identity is able to coexist with national identity. Looking at figure 2 one sees a very stable relationship between national identities and European identity. Those that feel more national than European are in the vast majority, with approximately 85% of all respondents, and those who feel more European are about 11% of all respondents. The lack of any noticeable fluctuation over time, especially with European identity, indicates that European identity is not replacing national identities. figure 3 shows a similar trend, with those who feel European at all remaining relatively stable at around 55% of respondents.

If anything, feelings of European identity have declined since a high point a decade ago, as shown in figure 1. This decline could be attributed to many things, though many believe it to be a growing dissatisfaction with the workings of the EU, rather than a rejection of a European identity. It has been suggested that this process works in cycles, from a high point at the entry of new members to the low point of growing knowledge of

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[62]   Even this is not universally accepted. Milward argues that the EU has actually rescued the European nation-state.
[63]   Hutchinson, 40.
[64]   Cameron, "Widening and deepening," 11.

and dissatisfaction with Europe, only to begin again with the next round of EU

expansion.[65] But given that the percentage of respondents feeling European has stabilized

in the last few years, this cycle of fluctuating European identification seems to have

ceased, with opinions now more stable and based upon long-term views.

European and National Identities Coexist

Hutchinson believes that it is readily apparent that European and national

identities coexist and now the question one must ask is "how is the EU to co-exist with

this national dimension?"[66] Risse's three forms of the relationship between European and

national identities—nested, cross-cutting, and intermingled—are interesting attempts to

categorize this complex relationship.[67] A cross-cutting relationship between national and

European identities would be one in which people shift from national to European

sentiments, depending on the situation, though there is little evidence to support this.

Risse's nested and intermingled forms, on the other hand, can be easily identified in the

relationship between European and national identities.

Triandafyllidou and Spohn note that as "an additional layer to the basic national

identity," European identity is not automatically powerfully felt. In fact, it may be

secondary to one's national identity.[68] Risse notes that "'country first, but Europe too' is

the dominant outlook in most EU member states, and people do not perceive this as

contradictory."[69] One might describe this situation as nested, in which one identity is less

valued than the other. One could suggest that European identity is the smaller, weaker

one, such that it is nested within the big, strong national identity. However, a national

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[65]   Heather Grabbe, "The newcomers," in *The Future of Europe*, 71.
[66]   Hutchinson, 47.
[67]   Risse, 168.
[68]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 8.
[69]   Risse, 167.

identity has a more limited scope and is thus nested within the broader scope of European

identity. Such a position "country first, but Europe too" can be held and not be

contradictory because the development of European identity is "a process that enhances

the enlargement, without causing a *thorough* reconfiguration of national identity."[70] Thus

national identity has persisted despite the growth of European identity. Again one can

find this assertion supported by the Eurobarometer polling data. One finds a clear

distinction in figure 2 between those who feel more European and those who feel more

allegiance to their national identity, with a spread of almost 75% as only an average of

11.14% of respondents feel more European, in contrast to the 85.35% whose national

identity is stronger.

Cameron notes that multiple identities are not only possible but a reality, for after

50 years of membership in various European organizations the member nations have

preserved their national characters, despite the growth of European identity.[71] Likewise,

Triandafyllidou and Spohn note that "the post Second World War European integration

project has been developing in interaction with the matrix of national groups and the web

of national identities involved in it and has been influenced by a set of interwoven

national and European elements."[72] Cameron notes that "the primary cleavage is between

those who identify only with their nation-state and those who combine national and

European identification in various ways."[73] Eurobarometer polling data supports this

observation. In figure 1 one sees that popular opinion tends to neatly fall into one of these

two categories, with the percentage self-identifying as European in some form higher

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[70]   Krystyna Romaniszyn, "Migration, cultural diversification and Europeanisation," in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration*, 115.
[71]   Cameron, "Widening and deepening," 11.
[72]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 8.
[73]   Cameron, "Europe's future," 151. Risse says almost exactly the same thing on p.167 of "Social Constructivism and European Integration."

when the percentage self-identifying as only national is lower, and vice versa. For example, the highest percentage of respondents who self-identified as European was 63% in December 1994, which also saw the lowest percentage of respondents claiming no European identity, at 33%. One concludes from this data European identity *is* doing away with identifying *exclusively* nationally. Münch claims, "a European collective consciousness is arising with a simultaneous weakening of national identities,"[74] though he does not clarify if the latter is dependent on the former.

However, one must qualify the perceived strength of European identity by noting that if European identification has increased among those who used to self-identify exclusively as national, it has not caused these same people to give up their national identities. Looking at table 2 one sees that the sum of the percentage of respondents who chose one of the two mixed identity options averages over 5% more than those who chose one of the two exclusive identity options, of which national identity was the clear preference. The four of fourteen polls where a greater percentage preferred the singular identities all occurred within the three year period of November 1996 to November 1999, excepting November 1998, suggesting that that this period may be an outlier, a period of time in which exclusively national identification enjoyed a short-lived resurgence. Again this is supported by the data table 1, as these polls had the four highest percentages of respondents self-identifying as exclusively national.

One way to understand this is that European identity is "an additional layer to the basic national identity."[75] Thus, to be European is not harmful to national identity, but in fact quite the opposite, a fuller expression of one's national identity. Another way to put it is as the intermingled, mutually dependent relationship Risse mentioned earlier.

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[74]   Münch, 59.
[75]   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 8.

Hutchinson declares that "many, if not most, European national identities have been developed either alongside or in relation to a sense of Europeanness, and most conceptions of 'Europe' arise out of prior national views of the world."[76] Thus, European identity can not just coexist with national identities but be an "integral part" of them, such that a key element of national identification is found in being European.[77] Martin declares that "being European is an integral part of our [Romanian] nationalism."[78] This anecdotal evidence suggests that national identity and European identity are sometimes mutually reinforcing. Risse states that "many people who strongly identify with their nation state also feel a sense of belonging to Europe."[79] Thus the interaction between national identities and the idea of Europe is not one that existed only centuries ago, when European identity was conceived exclusively as a cultural and religious construct, but also now. As the nations of Europe emerged from the destruction of World War II and embarked on a program of peaceful economic, and then political, unification, it would be foolish to not believe that their national identities changed as the nation-states gave up some elements of sovereignty and a new European identity, made definite in the EU and its predecessors, came into being. Risse puts this well when he notes that "EU membership has significant constitutive effects on European state identities."[80]

Challenges to Sovereignty

While the growth of the European Union and European identity does not directly challenge nations and national identities, it does cause a significant redefinition of sovereignty, to which national identities are intertwined. Hedetoft notes that people

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[76]   Hutchinson, 37.
[77]   Martin, 214.
[78]   Martin, 214.
[79]   Risse, 166.
[80]   Risse, 169.

"refuse to recognize any important distinction between sovereignty as an attribute of the

state and as their own cultural property."[81] Thanks to the success of the nation-state

within the last two centuries many have come to assume that a nation can only exist and

thrive when having its own state. Hutchinson makes a distinction between nation and

nation-state and notes that these two terms are often conflated. Many mistakenly "equate

the potency of the political nation with its modernising rather than with its identity

functions."[82] He believes that those describing the decline of the nation at the hands of

Europe are really describing the decline of the nation-state in respect to the EU. Thus, the

EU is seen as a threat to national identity because it *does* constrain the nation-state, taking

various elements of sovereignty previously reserved by the nations of Europe as their

exclusive, internal affairs as its own, such as control of its currency and its borders.[83]

O'Dowd and Wilson explain that "the power to exclude aliens is inherent to sovereignty

and essential for any political community."[84] As European identity is now intimately tied

to the EU, as Wilson notes, "the creation of a 'European identity' [is seen] as directly at

odds with their own, superordinate national identities."[85]

Must the loss of some sovereignty mean a threat to national identity? van Ham

declares that the growth of the complex, undefinable Europe "almost automatically

induces a dialectic desire for fixity and order."[86] This desire arises because sovereignty is

understood by most to require a "center stage" of power that can only be occupied by one

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[81] Hedetoft in Thomas M. Wilson, "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European integration," in *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, eds. Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1996) 208.

[82] Hutchinson, 36.

[83] Admittedly most EU nations are not participants in the euro. However, when one considers that one of the conditions of entrance in the EU for the new 2004 members is the eventually adoption of the euro, almost every EU country is committed to adopting the euro eventually.

[84] Liam O'Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, "Frontiers of sovereignty in the new Europe," in *Borders, Nations and States*, 10-11.

[85] Wilson, 208.

[86] van Ham, 93.

authority, which "has to be an easily identifiable unitary agent."[87] Europe has none of

these things; Europeanization is a political process that goes beyond sovereignty.[88] van

Ham sees the belief in national sovereignty to be "an oddity in our postmodern era," one

which is irrelevant thanks to the development of Europe and globalization.[89] Likewise,

with the opening and pooling of borders the notion of sovereign territory has lost

meaning, while the Europe is "redefining and reinventing both sovereignty and

territoriality."[90] This challenge to the attachment to national sovereignty has come about

due to the European denial of the traditional right of the nation to exclude any it wishes.[91]

Thus, an increased desire for national sovereignty implies that many believe national

identity to be threatened. However, this does not mean that European identity is

responsible. Only if it were to take on the trappings of national identity would it directly

threaten national identities. As Hutchinson noted, the nation has often been mistakenly

conflated with the nation-state.[92] It is not nations that are losing elements of their

sovereignty, but nation-states. Likewise, a nation does not require sovereignty to have a

distinct identity.

Boundaries and Identity

Borders and boundaries are commonly understood to play an essential role in

defining identities, performing the functions of "translation, differentiation, connection

and regulation" of the elements that form identities.[93] This differentiation function of

borders *is* the Self/Other distinction that is fundamental to any identity, for it is widely

understood that there is a strong link "between collective identity development and

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[87]   van Ham, 93.
[88]   van Ham, 94.
[89]   van Ham, 94.
[90]   van Ham, 95.
[91]   van Ham, 190.
[92]   Hutchinson, 36.
[93]   Raffestin as cited in O'Dowd and Wilson, 7.

boundary constructions."[94] While the continent of Europe is geographically well-defined, its boundaries in other spheres are less clear. With the EU now seen as Europe, Europe can be said to have political boundaries, namely the borders of EU states that are not between member states. However, this and other definitions of Europe's boundaries are problematized by the fluid and vague nature of the borders that have been assigned to Europe.

The importance of this view can be seen in the common understanding of widening and deepening. These two concepts both refer to the expansion of the EU, to include more countries on one hand and to include more elements of social and political life on the other. These two processes are understood to be "mutually reinforcing processes," by which the one necessitates the other, a continual cycle between the two forms of expansion.[95] This cycle of expansion is important, for it means that the definition of the EU is constantly in flux. Triandafyllidou and Spohn note, "On the Western European side, the opening of the Eastern European space means a geopolitical as well as a cultural reconfiguration of collective identities and redefinition of boundary constructions as cultural bases of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union."[96] Thus a physical expansion of Europe means an expansion of EU identity, as it must be defined to include both old and new members alike. As the diversity of the European population must invariably increase with expansion, the points in common must invariably decrease. However, common political values appear to remain just as strong, whereas common cultural elements are invariably diluted by expansion. For instance, many Eastern European countries see EU membership as part of being a "normal" country again, after

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94   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 8.
95   Cameron, "Principles and Problems," 107.
96   Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 9.

Soviet domination.[97] While there is an idea of cultural return or improvement, the idea of

a proper European politics as central to this normalcy. Likewise Greece, Portugal, and

Spain have all seen membership as solidifying and protecting their democratic systems

after years of dictatorship. Thus the growth of Europe inherently encourages European

civic identity while discouraging European cultural identity.

The Eastern European "return to Europe"[98] has several implications. First, it

reveals the importance political boundaries played in identity. This return also suggests a

voyage, a change of space. While many borders did change with the end of the Soviet

Union, the most dramatic change was political, rather than geographical. Thus this return

is a political journey, in which the nations of Eastern Europe take up the political forms

of Western Europe. Ironically, few of these nations had established traditions of

democracy or liberal capitalism before the imposition of the Soviet system. Thus it would

seem disingenuous call this transition a return, yet the widespread use of the phrase

suggests that it has been internalized as such. One must also admit that this return could

be a cultural one, from the Soviet to European culture.

However, inclusion and exclusion in Europe is even more complicated. Risse

notes that Italy's main slogan to promote its membership in the Euro zone was "entrare

l'Europa" (entering Europe).[99] By almost all accounts Italy has always been in Europe,

both geographically and as a founder of the ECSC over 50 years ago. Why then would

entering the Euro zone in the 1990's be seen as entering Europe? Without developing too

many conjectures about the Italian relationship to the rest of the EU and the idea of

Europe, it is safe to say that there is a perception that to be (fully) European requires

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[97]   Grabbe, 64-65.
[98]   Risse, 169.
[99]   Risse, 169.

membership in the EU, and more specifically, accepting all the elements of integration.

Thus "entrare l'Europa" reveals several important elements of European identity. First,

Europe *can* be entered, that is, it is a state to which to aspire. Implicit in this is a denial of

essentialist notions of identity. Second, the fact that Italy is proclaimed to be (re)entering

Europe, if one is to assume that Italy was previously in it, implies that Europe is a

changing notion and one with which one must keep up or be left by the wayside. Thus,

failure to participate in the Euro would be seen as quitting Europe. As the Euro zone is a

monetary union, this means that an important part of the current dominant discourse of

Europe is based on economic values. This should not come as a surprise considering the

EU's origins in the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC). However,

while the continuity of institutional focus is readily apparent, this definition of Europe is

not.

Europe's Confusing and Conflicting Boundaries

        Geographically Europe is understood to be the landmass bounded by the Atlantic

and the Mediterranean on three sides, but its eastern border is much less clear. The

current popular definition takes the Ural mountains to be its eastern border. From the

southern end the border of Europe runs southwest through the Black Sea to the

Mediterranean.[100] This is presumably the guide used to determine whether potential

member countries of the EU are European, which is a requirement for membership.[101]

The rejection of Morocco's application is a clear example of the use of these boundaries

by the EU to define Europe.[102] However, the question then is whether various peoples

along this borderline are European. For instance, many of the Caucasus republics identify

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[100] Jönsson et al., 6-7.
[101] There is also a peculiar conflict here in identity in which those not in the European Union are not
considered European, yet one must be European to join the EU.
[102] Cameron, "Principles and Problems," 109.

themselves as European, despite the fact that they are sometimes understood to be outside

this geographic line.[103] This can be seen in the membership of European organizations.

For example, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are members of the Council of Europe,

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the EU's Partnership and

Cooperation Agreements. Despite this they are not considered by the EU as potential

members, as they are understood to lie outside of Europe.[104] Similarly Turkey and Russia

both are partially in geographic Europe, Russia particularly so, yet most of the countries'

territories are outside of the continent. The EU has committed to eventual Turkish

membership, while the Russian case remains unclear.[105]

The role of EU in the construction of borders and boundaries is a novel case, as it

appears to be both strengthening and weakening them, which would appear at first glance

to be irreconcilable.[106] As seen both in the guaranteed freedom of movement of EU

citizens and in the "Europe of Regions" notion, the EU downplays and diminishes

internal borders between member states.[107] At the same time the EU seeks a common

external border policy. There is a strong exclusionary element in this policy, as seen in

the name used for it, "Fortress Europe," by critics, and not without reason. However,

there are many cracks in the EU's borders, making such a stark distinction between those

within and without the EU more difficult.

Europe is distinguished by its "overlapping and unclear boundaries."[108] As van

Ham puts it, "Europe is characterized by borders and boundaries that pass everywhere,

making the concept of internal and sovereign territory increasingly irrelevant."[109] As one

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[103] Jönsson et al., 6-7.
[104] Harris, 109.
[105] This is mostly due to the little enthusiasm on both sides for Russian membership.
[106] O'Dowd and Wilson, 2-3.
[107] O'Dowd and Wilson, 11.
[108] Risse, 170.
[109] van Ham, 95.

politician says, Europe is "like a rapidly growing child. [It] does not know where its body

ends."[110] The boundaries between EU and non-EU countries can be quite unclear. For

example, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland[111] participate in the EU's

Single Market, despite the fact that they are not members of the EU. Likewise, the first

three, as members of the European Economic Area, have contributed development funds

to Portugal[112] and the countries of the 2004 EU enlargement. Norway paid an additional

€567 million of subsidies in a bilateral agreement.[113] Thus the question of what it means

to be European is complicated, as one would assume that the Single Market and

development subsidies would be defining elements of Europe. The inclusion of these

nearby countries in fundamental elements of the EU suggest that a wider notion of

Europe, one that does not stop the borders of the EU, remains. One might suggest that

this is evidence of the continued power of a cultural conception of Europe. Another

possibility would be that Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland are included in

the civic notion of Europe thanks to their common belief in democracy and liberal

economics. While it is difficult to unpack the reasons behind why these specific countries

were included, it is most likely a mix of definitions, with the geographic and civic notions

taking precedence.

One way to explain the importance of boundaries in European identity when they

remain so unclear is to suggest that it is not boundaries themselves that define this

identity, but the joint action taken around these boundaries. Romaniszyn notes that there

has been the "development of a common European Union immigration and asylum

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[110] Dominique Moïsi in van Ham, 95.

[111] The basis for each country's participation is quite complex, though it should be noted that these four
countries are make up the European Free Trade Association.

[112] Portugal was an EFTA member and quit the organization when it joined what is now the EU. The fund
was begun when it joined the EFTA to finance its transition to democracy and was not halted when it
left the organization.

[113] Harris, 112.

regime, along with the decrease in internal border controls."[114] This development means that internal European boundaries are disappearing. However, the Schengen zone, in which participating countries' border controls along shared borders have been abolished, includes both some EU and non-EU countries. While Ireland and the United Kingdom are not members, it would make little sense to claim they are not a part of Europe. However, the incorporation of the Schengen Treaty into the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam shows that the Schengen Treaty can be considered an element of the EU. As the free movement of people is a central ideal of the EU,[115] one can assume that this idea plays an important role in European identity. How then to make sense of this confused situation? Romaniszyn suggests that "international inflows may help establish European identity … and hence, augment the Europeanisation process."[116] However, might it not be that it is the *process* of international inflows that helps establish this identity? As the borders themselves have less power, it is the cooperation related to the borders, rather than the borders themselves, that plays the important role in encouraging shared identity. The procedural identity that Giesen puts forward supports this notion, as it is in the political process—that is, the action of political cooperation and decision making—that European identity is found.[117]

The Problematization of the Self/Other Opposition

Thanks to its shifting borders and inclusive, civic basis, European identity does not create hard and fast distinctions between Self and Other. As O'Dowd and Wilson note, the Other without is "distant, weak or nebulous."[118] van Ham explains this situation

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[114] Romaniszyn, 114.
[115] O'Dowd and Wilson, 11.
[116] Romaniszyn, 114.
[117] Giesen, 22.
[118] O'Dowd and Wilson, 3.

very well: the belief that "claims about freedom, democracy, justice and the 'good

society' can only be made within strictly demarcated spatial boundaries" has been called

into question.[119] "The blurring of the inside/outside distinction requires a review of the

mental schemes" that are used to define identity.[120] Thus it is difficult to distinguish what

is and what is not European, as the boundaries between inclusion and exclusion are weak.

In European identity the Self/Other distinction is fluid, allowing for one to move

between categories. Martin declares, "No one is born a European ... one *becomes* a

European,"[121] and this statement has considerable truth. While the circumstances of one's

birth remain relevant, the importance of broad, even universalist, civic values makes it

quite easy for one to take this European identity as one's own. This can also work in the

other direction, with those who betray European ideals considered un-European. This is

obvious in the EU's exclusion of anti-democratic countries, both past and present. Greece,

Portugal, and Spain all only joined after their authoritarian regimes fell and democratic

systems were established in their stead. One should also consider the case of the Balkans.

During the violent breakup of Yugoslavia there was, not surprisingly, little enthusiasm

throughout Europe to acknowledge the Europeanness of the Balkans. A sort of

paternalistic explanation for the conflicts were often given, "a panoply of small, unviable,

mutually antagonistic and internally intolerant states,"[122] and thus totally different from

modern, enlightened Europeans.

This emphasis on sharing beliefs, rather than territory, helps partially explain why

Muslim communities in many European countries remain excluded, despite the younger

generations being born in Europe. While it is true that much of this animosity stems from

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[119] van Ham, 190.
[120] van Ham, 190.
[121] Martin, 221-222.
[122] Mazower as cited in Harris, 107.

culture clash, some of it arises out of different civic values. This can be seen in the growing nativist criticisms of Muslim communities as anti-democratic, misogynistic, and opposed to human rights. Thus these communities are excluded, defined as an Other to the European Self, despite existing within the physical borders of Europe. It is this excluded community that O'Dowd and Wilson describe as "the Other within."[123]

The "fuzzy boundaries"[124] of the EU, and thus Europe, make it difficult to pin down what is the European Self and the external Other. Risse explains that the creation of the Other is context-dependent, and "as much as there is no fixed meaning what Europe constitutes positively, there are no fixed European 'others'."[125] O'Dowd and Wilson go so far as to claim that "Europe has never had settled boundaries."[126] The fluidity of boundaries means that Self/Other distinctions in civic European identity have not been able to crystallize. This identity in the latter half of the 20th Century had been defined to a significant extent around the contrast between the Western European Self and the Communist Other.[127] However, EU expansion to the east following the fall of Communism has destroyed this notion; one has seen "a geopolitical as well as a cultural reconfiguration of collective identities and redefinition of boundary constructions."[128] Thus European identity does not have a clear Self/Other distinction. This situation maybe be temporary, though it appears possible that no clearly defined Other will arise to take the place of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

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[123] O'Dowd and Wilson, 3.
[124] Risse, 170.
[125] Risse, 171.
[126] O'Dowd and Wilson, 9.
[127] Risse, 167.
[128] Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 9.

Conclusion

　　To be European now means to believe in a set of liberal political values. Thanks to the conflation of Europe and the European Union, European identity is tied closely to the common institutions and ideals of the EU, rather than history, language, or culture. This collective identity is able to coexist with national identities, as it occupies a distinct space. European identity is quite expansive, and it is relatively easy to become European. Boundaries and borders which have traditionally served to demarcate peoples are increasingly irrelevant thanks to their confusing and conflicting application to Europe, which serves to weaken and devalue them. Thus the Other to the European Self is largely undefined and elusive, though fundamentalist Islam appears to be taking on this role. To be European no longer means to belong to a narrow cultural project, but instead to participate in an inclusive political project. While not immune to the exclusiveness that has plagued cultural identities, the current European identity promises an expansive engagement with the world.

Appendices

Table 1 EU Average Self-Identification

Poll	Nationality only	Nationality and European	European and Nationality	European only	Don't Know
April 1992	38	48	6	4	4
November 1993	40	45	7	4	3
December 1994	33	46	10	7	4
June 1995	37	45	8	6	3
December 1995	40	46	6	5	3
November 1996	46	40	6	5	3
April 1997	45	40	6	5	4
May 1998	44	41	6	5	4
November 1998	43	43	7	4	2
November 1999	45	42	6	4	3
June 2000	41	45	7	4	2
January 2001	38	49	6	3	3
November 2001	44	44	6	3	3
April 2004	41	46	6	4	3

Source: "Question 40." Original data from Eurobarometer polls EB37.0, EB40, EB42, EB43.1, EB44.1, EB46.0, EB47.1, EB49, EB50.0, EB52.0, EB53.0, EB54.1, EB56

**Table 2** Exclusivity of EU Average Self-Identification Options

| Poll	Both Inclusive	Both Exclusive	Nationality Only	European Only
April 1992	54	42	38	4
November 1993	52	44	40	4
December 1994	56	40	33	7
June 1995	53	43	37	6
December 1995	52	45	40	5
November 1996	46	51	46	5
April 1997	46	50	45	5
May 1998	47	49	44	5
November 1998	50	47	43	4
November 1999	48	49	45	4
June 2000	52	45	41	4
January 2001	55	41	38	3
November 2001	50	47	44	3
April 2004	52	45	41	4

Source: table 1

Table 3 EU Average Support for Turkish Membership

Poll	In Favor	Not in Favor	Don't Know
January 1996	36	44	20
April 1997	32	45	23
April 1999	29	47	23
November 1999	30	47	23
June 2000	30	47	23
January 2001	30	48	22
November 2001	34	46	20

Source:"Question 37." Original data from Eurobarometers
EB42, EB44.2bis, EB47.1, EB48.0, EB49, EB50.0, EB51.0,
EB52.0, EB53, EB54.1, and EB56.2

FIGURE 1 EU Average Self-Identification
Data Source: table 1

Legend:
- Nationality only
- Nationality and European
- European and Nationality
- European only
- Don't Know

X-axis (Polling Dates): April 1992, November 1993, December 1994, June 1995, December 1995, November 1996, April 1997, May 1998, November 1998, November 1999, June 2000, January 2001, November 2001, April 2004

Y-axis (Percentage of Respondents): 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, 22.5, 25, 27.5, 30, 32.5, 35, 37.5, 40, 42.5, 45, 47.5, 50

FIGURE 2 EU Average Predominate Self-Identification
Data Source: table 1, columns combined

Percentage of Respondents

Polling Dates

More European
More National

FIGURE 3 EU Average Consolidated Self-Identification
Data Source: table 1, columns combined

FIGURE 4 EU Average Opinion on Future Turkish Membership
Data Source: table 3

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